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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY CLEGHORN, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
v. 
DR. SCHOW, DR. WILFERT, 
T. KENNETH ORTON, BOYD G. 
HOLBROOK, THOMAS D. NOONAN, 
JOHN DOE and ST. MARK'S 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16329 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, T. KENNETH ORTON 
Appeal From A Judgment Of The Third Judicial District Court 
In And For Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, Presiding 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-appellant 
alleging medical malpractice on the part of defendant-respondent 
T. Kenneth Orton, among others. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable G. 
Hal Taylor, Judge, granted the Motion for Judgment brought by 
respondent Orton. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Orton seeks an affirmance of the Judgment 
dated December 20, 1978 granting his Motion for Judgment of 
Dismissal and ordering that appellant's Complaint be dismissed 
as to respondent Orton with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was injured in an automobile accident on 
January 25, l976,as a result of which he was taken to St. Mark's 
Hospital in Salt Lake City on the same day. He was treated 
and then released. He returned to the hospital the next day 
complaining of pain at which time X-rays were taken, including 
X-rays of his cervical spine. The X-rays of the spine were 
interpreted by Dr. Orton on January 26, 1976. Appellant was 
admitted to the hospital for treatment oftther injuries. Be-
cause of persisting neck pain another set of cervical spine 
X-rays was taken on January 31, 1976. These films were inter-
preted as showing a vertebral body displacement at the C-6, 
C-7 interspace and a fracture at the C-7 articular pillar. 
Subsequently, surgery was performed on appellant's cervical 
spine on February 3, 1976. Immediately following the surgery 
appellant experienced paralysis of his lower extremities. 
Other manifestations of a spinal cord lesion manifested them-
selves thereafter. 
-2-
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On January 24, 1978 the Complaint in the case at bar 
was filed. On January 27, 1978 a Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action was served on Dr. Orton accompanied by a summons and 
copy of the Complaint filed January 24. 
On March 21, 1978 respondent Orton filed his Answer. 
On August 22, 1978 respondent Orton filed an Amended Answer 
pursuant to a Consent executed by Richard W. Giauque as attar-
ney for appellant Larry Cleghorn on August 14, 1978. 
On November 13, 1978 respondent Orton filed a Motion 
for Judgment pursuant to Rules 12 and 56(b), U.R.C.P. Hearing 
was had on said Motion on December 18, 1978 at which hearing 
the lower court granted the Motion. This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
IN GRANTING RESPONDENT ORTON'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
The lower court correctly applied Sections 78-14-8 
and 78-14-4 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in granting 
respondent Orton's Motion for Judgment. Appellant Cleghorn 
discoverd his injury no later than February 3, 1976. Appellant 
filed a Complaint on or about January 24, 1978. On January 
27, 1978 Dr. Orton was served with a Notice of Intent to Com-
mence Action along with a summons and a copy of the Complaint 
filed on January 24. 
-3-
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The lower court ruled that since the filing of the 
Complaint on January 24 was not preceded by the service of 
a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, the lawsuit against 
respondent and the other named defendants was not commenced 
according to the requirements of the Malpractice Act, and 
hence the statute of limitations applicable to this action 
continued to run. The statute of limitations ran out, appel-
lant's cause of action was barred before his suit was properly 
commenced, and therefore respondent's Motion for Judgment was 
granted. 
Appellant now asks this Court to reconsider its 
decision in Vealy v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (1978), and overrule 
it. Appellant argues that Vealy should be overruled because 
it is based on a misinterpretation of the Malpractice Act. 
Respondent Orton respectfully submits that Vealy was properly 
decided and should stand. 
Appellant is convinced that this Court improperly 
applied Section 78-14-8 of the Malpractice Act retroactively 
to causes of action which arose prior to April 1, 1976 but 
which were sued upon after that date. In so arguing, appellant 
ignores the clearly expressed intention of the Utah Legislature 
as well as familiar and widely applied rules of judicial con-
struction of statutes. 
Section 78-14-11 of the Malpractice Act provides: 
Act not retroactive - Exception. -The 
provisions of this act, with the exception 
-4-
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of the provisions relating to the limitation 
on the time for commencing an action, shall 
not apply to injuries, death or services 
rendered which occurred prior to the effec-
tive date of this act. (Emphasis added) 
Even a cursory examination of Section 78-14-8 
shows that said Section is so intimately connected with 
the statute of limitations as found in Section 78-14-4 that 
those two sections must be construed together. 
Section 78-14-4 provides in pertinent part: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is com-
menced within two years after the plaintiff 
or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discov-
ered the injury, whichever first occurs. 
(emphasis added) 
Section 78-14-8 provides in part: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be commenced unless and until 
the plaintiff gives the prospective defen-
dant or his executor or successor, at least 
ninety days' prior notice of intent to com-
mence an action . 
* * * 
Such notice shall be served within the 
time allowed for commencing a malpractice 
action against a health care provider. If 
the notice is served less than ninety days 
prior to the expiration of the applicable 
time period, the time for commencing the 
malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to ninety days 
from the date of service of notice. (Em-
phasis added) 
This Court recognized in the Vealy decision that 
the two sections quoted above must be construed together. 
-5-
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Furthermore, the use of the word 11 provisions" in Section 78-14-ll ! 
shows that the Legislature intended Section 78-14-8 as well as 
Section 78-14-4 to be applied to actions commenced after the 
effective date of the Malpractice Act. This intent is fur-
ther emphasized by the fact that Section 78-14-4 itself pro-
vides that the section is to be applied retroactively. Subsec-
tion (2) thereof states: 
The provisions of this section shall apply 
to all persons regardless of minority or other 
legal disability and shall apply retroactivela 
to all persons, partnerships, associations an 
corporations and to all health care providers 
and to all malpractice actions against health 
care providers based upon alleged personal in-
juries which occurred prior to the effective 
date of this act .... (Emphasis added) 
If Section 78-14-11 intended that only 78-14-4 was 
to be applied retroactively then Section 78-14-11 would thereby 
by rendered superfluous and redundant. As is stated in 73 ArnJur 
Statutes, Section 250: 
In the interpretation of a statute, the legis-
lature will be presumed to have inserted every 
part thereof for a purpose. Thus, it should not 
be presumed that any provision of a statute is 
redundant. A statute should not be construed in 
such manner as to render it partly ineffective 
or inefficient if another construction will make 
it effective. Indeed, it is a cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that significance and 
effect should, if possible, without destroying 
the sense or effect of the law, be accorded 
every part of the act, including every section, 
paragraph, sentence or clause, phrase, and word. 
(Footnotes omitted) 
This Court was following these rules when it 
stated in Horman v. Liguor Control Commission, 21 Utah 2d 
294, 296, 445 P.2d 4 (1968): 
-6-
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The difficulty with the plaintiff's 
position is that it fails to give effect 
to the exceptions provided for in the lan-
guage at the end of said Sec. 27 as empha-
sized above. This runs counter to a founda-
tional rule of statuto"ry construction which 
requires us to assume that all of the words 
in a statute were used advisedly and that 
an application of the statute is favored 
which will give effect to all of its pro-
visions. (Footnote omitted) 
Accord, Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 
P.2d 1035 (1972); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 
984 (1965); Metropolitan Water Dist. of Salt Lake City v. Salt 
Lake City, 14 Utah 2d 171, 380 P.2d 721 (1963); Peay v. Board 
of Ed. of Provo County School Dist., 14 Utah 2d 63, 377 P.2d 
490 (1962). 
Coupled with the legislative intent shown above that 
Section 78-14-8 was to be applied retrospectively, is the general 
rule of statutory construction that a statute merely affecting 
a remedy or law of procedure applies to actions begun after 
it becomes effective, whether the cause of action arose before 
or after the effective date. See, e.g., 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 
Sections 417 and 421; 73 AmJur 2d, Statutes, Section 354; 
Bodine v. Department of Labor & Industries, 190 P.2d 89 
(Wash. 1948); Ohlinger v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 40 (D. 
Idaho 1955) 
This Court has followed the rule stated above in 
the cases of Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P.ll7 (1909), 
and Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948). 
-7-
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The Court in Boucofski, stated: 
While it is true that a party's rights in 
a judgment, as a general rule, may not be 
affected by legislative acts passed or 
which become effective after the entry of 
a judgment, the rule does not apply to 
laws which are merely remedial, and which 
only affect matters of procedure or prac-
tice. (104 P. at 117) 
In Petty, the Court stated: 
. . . where a statute remedial in nature is 
amended providing a different remedy, all 
actions pending will be governed by the new 
statutory provisions. (192 P.Zd at 593) 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
lower court correctly applied the law as found in the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act and Vealy v. Clegg. It is further 
submitted that Vealy was properly decided and there is no sound 
reason to now overrule it. Therefore the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
provides: 
POINT II 
THE 1979 AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH 
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT 
CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY; 
TO DO SO WOULD DEPRIVE RESPONDENT 
AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED OF A 
DEFENSE WHICH WAS GOOD WHEN THE 
AMENDMENT WAS PASSED, IN DEROGA-
TION OF RESPONDENT'S RIGHTS UNDER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
-8-
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Appellant Cleghorn argues that application of the 
1979 Amendment to the Malpractice Act to the case at bar would 
not be violative of either the Utah or the United States Con-
stitutions because to do so would not impair any vested or 
fundamental right. Appellant cites the case of Chase Securities 
Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 
1628 (1945) in support of this proposition. 
Citing the case of Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.620, 
6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483, the Supreme Court in Donaldson 
stated: 
Where lapse of time has not invested a party 
with title to real or personal property, a 
state legislature, consistently with the 
Fourteenth Amendment may repeal or extend a 
statute of limitations, even after right of 
action is barred thereby, restore the plain-
tiff his remedy, and divest the defendant 
of the statutory bar. (325 U.S. at 311-12) 
While the Supreme Court declined to overrule Campbell 
in Donaldson, the Court stated: 
We are reminded that some state courts have 
not followed it L-Campbell7 in construing 
provisions of their constitutions similar 
to the due process clause. Many have, as 
they are privileged to do, so interpreted 
their own easily amendable constitutions 
to give restrictive clauses a more rigid inter-
pretation than we properly could impose upon 
them from without by construction of the Fe-
deral instrument which is amendable only with 
great difficulty and with the cooperation of 
many States. (Citing, inter alia, In re 
Swan, 95 Utah 408, 79 P.2d 999 (193~ 
TITS U.S. at 312-13, including n.' 9 at 312) 
-9-
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Since handing down the decision in the case of Ireland 
v. MacKintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P.901 (1900), the Utah Supreme 
Court has declined to follow the holding and rationale in 
Campbell. At Page 904 of Ireland, this Court held: 
We are clearly of the opinion . . . 
that, when appellant's right of action on 
the note in question became barred under 
the previous statute, the respondent acquired 
a vested right, in this state, to plead that 
statute as a defense and bar to the action. 
The result of the holding in Ireland was to forbid retrospective 
application of an amendment to the statute of limitations of 
Utah extending the period of limitations for suing on a written 
obligation from four years to six years. 
Ireland was followed in In re Swan's Estate, which 
was cited by the United States Supreme Court in Donaldson. 
Ireland was subsequently cited with approval by the 
Utah Supreme Court as late as 1975 in the case of Greenhalgh 
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799. In Footnote 14 at Page 802, Mr. 
Justice Crockett writing for the Court stated: 
Here we note the cause of action against 
defendant Payson City accrued in Jan. 1970 
and was barred after Jan. 1971, thus the 1973 
amendment to Sec. 10-7-77, U.C.A. 1953 (Supp. 
1973), which provides: ". . . If the person 
for whom the claim is made is a minor, then 
the claims covered by this section may be so 
presented within the time limit specified 
above or within one year after the person 
reaches the age of majority, whichever is 
longer," is not applicable in this case be-
cause as was held in Ireland v. MacKintosh, 
22 Utah 296, 61 P.901, "The subsequent passage 
-10-
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of an act by the legislature increasing the 
period of limitation could not operate to 
affect or renew a cause of action already 
barred." .... 
Mr. Justice Crockett, again writing for this Court, 
in the case of State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1977), 
stated: 
. . . the law should not be changed simply 
because the will or desire of judges as to 
what the law is or ought to be. Much less 
so, should it be so changed during the course 
of a particular proceeding to have a retro-
active affect thereon. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the change the state advocates 
would vindicate the position taken in the 
dissent referred to, to so rule in this 
case retroactively would violate what we 
regard as a higher principle: that of 
honoring the established law. If there is 
to be such a change in the law, whether b¥ 
legislative act or by judicial decision, 1t 
seems that it should have only prospective 
affect and that fairness and good conscience 
require that it should not be applied retro-
actively to adversely affect rights as they 
existed at the time a particular controversy 
arose. (Footnote omitted) (Emphasis added) 
Of particular force with respect to the case at bar 
is the 1978 case of Del Monte Corporation v. Moore, 580 P.2d 
224. Citing Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, supra, 
Mr. Justice Crockett stated: 
The general and well established principle 
of law is that statutes prescribing limita-
tions relate to remedies; and that the legis-
lature has power to increase the time in 
which an action may be brought. In that 
connection it should be observed that if the 
-11-
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statute has run on a cause of action, so 
that it is dead, itmnnot be revived b~ 
any such statutory extension. (580 P. d 
at 225) (emphasis added) 
It is therefore clear that while appellant may be 
correct in characterizing statutes of limitations as relating 
to remedies rather than substantive law, it is likewise clear 
that the rule has long been and remains in Utah that if a de-
fense based on the statute of limitations is available and 
invoked by a defendant, such defense becomes a vested right 
of which the defendant cannot be deprived without due process 
of law. Retrospective application of the 1979 Amendment to 
the Malpractice Act would act to divest respondent of his de-
fense of statute of limitations which was good at the time the 
Amendment was passed. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Utah 
State Legislature could not impair respondent's statute of 
limitations defense by legislative enactment, and if this 
Court finds that it was the legislature's intention to so do, 
then the Amendment must be declared unconstitutional as viola-
tive of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. If 
the constitutionality of the Amendment is to be preserved, the 
Amendment must be construed as having prospective application 
only. 
POINT III 
RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 1979 
AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH HEALTH CARE 
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MALPRACTICE ACT WOULD RENDER 
SAID AMENDMENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE VI, 
SECTION 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
Article VI, Section 26 prohibits the legislature 
from enacting special laws in particular cases and states: 
No private or special law shall be enacted 
where a general law can be applicable. 
The definition of "special laws" is found in Mr. Justice 
Maughan's opinion for this Court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance 
Company v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 751, 
754 (1977): 
In State v. Kallas /97 Utah 492, 505, 94 P.2d 
414 (19391/ this court set forth the general 
definitions of general and special laws. A 
general law applies to and operates uniformly 
upon all members of any class of persons, places, 
or things requiring legislation peculiar to them-
selves in the matters covered by the laws in 
question. On the other hand, special legisla-
tion relates either to particular persons, places, 
or things or to persons, places, or things which, 
though not particularized, are separated by any 
method of selection from the whole class to which 
the law might, but for such legislation, be 
applied. 
In People v. Western Fruit Growers /72 Cal. 
2d 494, 140 P.Zd 13, 19-20 (19431/ the court 
stated a law is general when it applies equally 
to all persons embraced in a class founded upon 
some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional dis-
tinction. It is special legislation if it con-
fers particular privileges or imposes peculiar 
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the 
exercise of a common right; upon a class of 
persons arbitrarily selected, from the general 
body of those who stand in precisely the same 
relation to the subject of the law. (Emphasis 
added) 
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After analyzing the 1979 Amendment to the Malpractice 
Act, appellant Cleghorn at Pages 15-16 of his brief makes the 
following statement: 
Cleghorn urges this Court to carefully 
discern and analyze this legislative 
intent .... Having done so, this Court 
will surely conclude that the Legislature 
intended to avoid the consequences which 
it deemed unfair, and to insure that all 
of the endin mal ractice actions in---
w ic t e causes o action arose before 
April 1! 1976, be spared the unconscienable 
fate su fered by the plaintiff in Vealy. 
(Emphasis added) 
Counsel for Cleghorn elsewhere implies in his brief to this 
Court that the legislature had the cases pending before this 
Court which had issues relating to the Malpractice Act, in 
mind when it passed the 1979 Amendment to the Act. If this 
is true and the Amendment applied retrospectively, then the 
Amendment must be considered special legislation because it 
relates either to particular persons, 
places, or things or to persons, places, 
or things which, though not particularized, 
are separated by any method of selection 
from the whole class to which the law 
might, but for such legislation be applied. 
(564 P.2d at 754) 
If, on the other hand, the Amendment is construed 
to be of prospective application only, then it is obviously 
of general application and would not suffer the constitutional 
infirmity it would suffer if given retrospective application. 
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that this 
Court should construe the 1979 Amendment to the Malpractice 
Act as having prospective application only in order to save 
the Amendment from unconstitutionality. 
POINT IV 
THE FINAL CLAUSE OF SECTION 
78-14-8 AS AMENDED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE IN 1979 IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article VI, Section 22 provides in pertinent part: 
* * * Except general appropriations bills 
and bills for the codification and general 
revision of laws, no bill shall be passed 
containing more than one subject, which 
shall be clearly expressed in its title. * * * 
(This provision formerly found in Art. VI, 
Sec. 23) 
In State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 419 
(1939), this Court stated the purpose of this constitutional 
provision as follows: 
The constitutional provision is for a 
particular purpose and it is not a tech-
nical restriction on the legislature. 
That practical purpose is to inform the 
legislature and the public what legisla-
tion is proposed, and a title is sufficient 
that will lead to an inquiry into the body 
of the act to ascertain changes proposed 
in the original and existing law. 
The title of H.B. 164 reads as follows: 
AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 78-14-4 AND 78-14-8, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY 
CHAPTER 23, LAWS OF UTAH 1976; RELATING TO 
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HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE: PROVIDING THAT 
THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL SHALL 
NOT ACT TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
SET FORTH IN THAT SECTION; PROVIDING THAT 
NOTICES OF INTENT TO BRING MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 
BE SIGNED BY THE PLAINTIFF OR HIS ATTORNEY; 
PROVIDING THAT THE NOTICE MAY BE SERVED BY 
CERTIFIED MAIL; AND EXTENDING THE TIME FOR 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS WHERE THE NOTICE 
IS SERVED LESS THAN 90 DAYS PRIOR TO THE 
EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The final clause of H.B. 164 is an amendment to 
Section 78-14-8 and reads as follows: 
This section shall, for purposes of 
determining its retroactivity, not be con-
strued as relating to the limitation on the 
time for commencing any action, and shall 
apply only to causes of action arising on 
or after April 1, 1976. This section shall 
not apply to third party actions, counter-
claims or crossclaims against a health care 
provider. 
It is clear that the title of H.B. 164 makes no 
reference to this clause. While it is true that the title of 
an amendment is constitutionally proper if it refers to the 
section to be amended (see, e.g. Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 
95 P. 367 (1908)), it does not follow that when the legislature 
chooses to be specific in setting out those portions of a 
statute which are to be amended, the failure to specify an 
entire amendatory cause does not run afoul of the purpose of 
Article VI, Section 22. A legislator or a member of the pub-
lic who read the title to the 1979 Amendment ID the Malpractice 
Act was not led "to an inquiry into the body of the act to 
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ascertain changes proposed in the original and existing law," 
simply because of the specificity of the legislature in listing 
the other portions of the Act that were to be amended. Espe-
cially in the case of legislators who were working under the 
burden of a mountain of legislative proposals, the failure to 
mention the final clause in the title of the Amendment amounts 
almost to a deception and certainly renders the final clause 
unconstitutional as violative of Article VI, Section 22. 
The fact that the final clause of the Amendment is 
constitutionally infirm does not imply that the entire 
Amendment be declared unconstitutional. As was pointed out 
by this Court in Riggins v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 
P.2d 645, 650 (1935): 
However, a failure of a legislative enactment 
to comply with [Art. VI, Sec. 2~ does not 
render the act unconstitutional as to subject 
matters which are clearly expressed in the 
title of the act. The rule is thus stated in 
1 Cooley's fonstitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) 
p. 308: "/ ... 7 If, by striking from the 
act all that relates to the object not indicated 
by the title, that which is left is complete in 
itself, sensible, capable of being executed, and 
wholly independent of that which is rejec~ed, 
it must be sustained as constitutional. [ . .. _7" 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the final 
clause of the H.B. 164 amendment of Section 78-14-8 is uncon-
stitutional as violative of Article VI , Section 22 of the 
Constitution of Utah and so should be stricken from the Amendment. 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT V 
THE 1979 AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT CANNOT BE 
APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY SO AS TO 
VALIDATE A PROCEEDING UNAUTHORIZED 
BY THE ORIGINAL ACT. 
As the analysis under Point I above has shown, the 
appellant's original malpractice action against this respon-
dent was never commenced because of failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Malpractice Act. It would be anomalous if 
a subsequent amendment to that Act could be applied retrospec-
tively to validate a proceeding which was unauthorized by the 
Act itself. 
This issue was squarely faced by the Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court in People v. Tax Commission, 
26 N.Y.S. 2d 425 (1941). In that case, the court was faced 
with an amendment of the New York law relating to the require-
ment of a trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
At the time of the decision by the referee, he 
was required by law to "state separately the facts found and 
conclusions of law." (26 N.Y.S. 2d at 428) This he failed 
to do, but prior to the appeal of the matter, the law was 
changed to provide that: 
the decision of the court may be oral or 
in writing and. . . must state the facts 
which it deems essential. (IbidJ 
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The referee had filed a written opinion, and the 
respondent contended that the change in the statutory procedure 
should be applied to the proceedings so that the opinion of 
the referee would suffice to constitute a ''decisio~' and hence 
meet the requirements of the amended law. 
The appellate Court stated: 
It is unquestionably true that a statu-
tory change in matters of procedure will affect 
pending actions and proceedings unless the 
language of the act excludes them from its opera-
tion. However, something more than the applica-
tion of that proposition is involved here. This 
rule has been generally understood to refer 
only to those pending actions in which the 
procedureal step changed by the new law has 
not yet been taken. The respondent contends, 
howeverS that the rule is so extensive that 
it m~ e used to validate a proceeding unau-
thor~zed by the prior statute. Such a con-
struction, we think, is contrary to the neces-
sity for consistent practice and has no support 
in authoritative decisions. Unless procedure 
is to be involved in chaos it must be governed 
by the law regulating it at the time the ques-
tion of procedure arises. Southwick v. South-
wick, 49 N.Y. 510; Lazarus v. Metropolitan Ele-
vated Railway Co., 145 N.Y. 581, 40 N.E. 240; 
Matter of Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87, 
416. (Ibid.) (Emphasis added) 
The New York case is directly in point here. Under 
the Malpractice Act as it was passed in 1976, a malpractice 
action could not be legally commenced unless and until a Notice 
of Intent to Commence Action was served on the prospective 
defendants. Therefore, the Complaint filed by appellant herein 
did not serve to commence a malpractice action against this 
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respondent; the attempted "action" was invalid from the begin-
ning. The 1979 Amendment to the Malpractice Act cannot now 
be applied to validate that action. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM THAT 
RESPONDENT ORTON WAIVED ANY 
DEFENSE BASED ON THE UTAH HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT BECAUSE AP-
PELLANT CONSENTED TO THE FILING 
OF RESPONDENT'S AMENDED ANSWER 
IN WHICH SUCH A DEFENSE IS RAISED 
On May 5, 1978, more than three months following the 
filing of the Complaint in this case, counsel for appellant 
wrote a letter to the various counsel for respondents in 
which he stated: 
You will recall that we dulz filed and 
served the statutory (UCA /-Sec./78-14-8) 
"Notice of Intent to Commence Action" upon 
various defendants simultaneously with ser-
vice upon them of the summons and complaint 
in this action; in the answer of Dr. Wilfert 
the defense was raised that the required no-
tice was not given ninety days prior to commence-
ment of the action; while I believe the defense 
has no merit whatever, any problem can easily 
be corrected by my re-serving that defendant or 
any others that may seek to raise such a de-
fense .... (R. 176-77) 
In response to this letter, counsel for respondent 
Orton wrote the letter of May 10, 1978, a copy of which is 
attached as "Exhibit B" to appellant's brief. 
On August 11, 1978, counsel for Dr. Orton wrote 
the letter of August 11, 1978, a copy of which is attached 
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as Exhibit "D" to appellant's brief. In that letter, respon-
dent's counsel stated: 
Enclosed please find Motion for leave 
to file an Amended Answer on behalf of 
Dr. T. Kenneth Orton, and also the prorosed 
Amended Answer which sets forth the de ense 
of statute of limitations. I also enclose 
original and two copies of a Consent that 
Dr. T. Kenneth Orton file the enclosed 
Amended Answer. If you are willing to sign 
the Consent without the necessity of the 
hearing on my Motion, please execute and 
return to me the original and one copy thereof. 
(Emphasis added) 
On August 14, 1978, counsel for appellant sent a 
letter to respondent Orton's counsel stating: 
As you requested, enclosed please find 
the original and one copy of the Consent 
form allowing you to file your proposed 
amended answer for ~e defendant T. Kenneth 
Orton in this matter. (R. 210) 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
in part that" ... a party may amend his pleading .. by 
written consent of the adverse party. " 
Rule 15(c) is entitled "Relation Back of Amendments" 
and provides: 
Wherever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence set forth 
or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading. 
Dr. Orton's original Answer was filed on or about 
March 14, 1978. By virtue of the provisions of Rule 15(c), 
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the defense of failure to comply with the provisions of the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act contained in the Amended 
Answer relates back to March 14, 1978. 
Appellant argues that Rules 8(c) and 12(h) work to 
bar this respondent from asserting his defenses under the 
Malpractice Act. The provisions of Rule lS(c) likewise an-
swer that argument. Plaintiff's interpretation of Rules 8(c) 
and 12(h) would render Rule 15 a nullity in that parties could 
never effectively amend their pleadings. 
Appellant makes much of his contention that he had 
consented to the filing of an Amended Answer containing a 
statute of limitations defense but not a defense asserting 
non-compliance with the notice provisions of the Malpractice 
Act. There are two answers to this contention. First, appel-
lant's counsel had before him a copy of the Amended Answer at 
the time he executed the Consent to the filing of that Amended 
Answer on behalf of his client. Second, as demonstrated in 
Vealy v. Clegg, a statute of limitations defense clearly may 
include issues involving failure to serve a Notice of Intent 
to Commence Action or a defect in said Notice. 
It is respectfully submitted that appellant's argu-
ment that this respondent had waived any defense based on the 
Malpractice Act is clearly without merit. If, arguendo, de-
fendant had waived by failing to include his defense in the 
original answer, plaintiff forgave said waiver by consenting 
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to the filing of the Amended Answer which set forth the defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has argued that to apply the 1979 Amend-
ment to the Utah Health' Care Malpractice Act would not impair 
any vested rights. Appellant does not take into account any 
of the rights that vested and were relied upon as a result of 
the Legislature's passage of the Malpractice Act in 1976. The 
Dictrict Court correctly interpreted the Act and this Court 
sustained that interpretation in the well-reasoned and entirely 
correct decision in Vealy v. Clegg. Appellant ignores the cases 
that may have been settled as a result of the passage of the 
Malpractice Act and its interpretation in Vealy. And what of 
the parties in Vealy itself? Appellant cannot seriously con-
tend that no rights vested or that no reliance was placed on 
the Malpractice Act and its interpretation under Vealy. 
The analysis in this brief has shown that, in Utah, 
respondent has a vested right to his statute of limitations 
defense, and further that this vested right is of the type 
which is included in the due process protection of Article I, 
Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. Respondent has also 
shown that if the legislature intended retrospective appli-
cation of the 1979 Amendment of the Malpractice Act, said Amend-
ment would amount to special legislation which is forbidden by 
Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution of Utah. Furthermore, 
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the final clause of amended Section 78-14-8 must be declared 
unconstitutional because no mention of said clause is made 
in the title of H.B. 164 as required by Article VI, Sectian22 
of the Constitution of Utah. 
Finally, the analysis under Point IV above shows 
that counsel for appellant knowingly consented to the filing 
of an Amended Answer by respondent Orton which Answer pleaded 
a defense based on the statute of limitations. Thus whether 
respondent Orton may have earlier waived a defense based on 
the statute of limitations is a moot question. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAYLE, CHILD & RITCHIE 
R.M. Child 
Attorneys for Respondent Orton 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and cor-
rect copies of Brief of Defendant-Respondent T. Kenneth Orton, 
first-class postage thereon prepaid, to Richard W. Giauque, 
Richard W. Casey, Berman & Giauque, attorneys for plaintiff-
appellant, 500 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and 
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to J. Anthony Eyre, Kipp and Christian, Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Dr. Wilfert, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 on this~ day of June, 1979. 
~I 
R. M. Child 
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